Inflation and growth by Robert J. Barro
1 Table 1 shows that the cross-
country mean of inﬂation ex-
ceeded the median for each
decade. This property reﬂects the
skewing of inﬂation rates to the
right, as shown in Figure 1. That
is, there are a number of outliers
with positive inﬂation rates of
large magnitude, but none with
negative inﬂation rates of high
magnitude. Because this skew-
ness increased in the 1980s, the
mean inﬂation rate rose from the
1970s to the 1980s, although
the median rate declined.
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n recent years, many central banks have
placed increased emphasis on price 
stability. Monetary policy—whether
expressed in terms of interest rates or
growth of monetary aggregates—has been
increasingly geared toward the achieve-
ment of low and stable inﬂation. Central
bankers and most other observers view
price stability as a worthy objective
because they think that inﬂation is costly.
Some of these costs involve the average
rate of inﬂation, and others relate to the
variability and uncertainty of inﬂation. But
the general idea is that businesses and
households are thought to perform poorly
when inﬂation is high and unpredictable.
The academic literature contains a lot
of theoretical work on the costs of inﬂa-
tion, as reviewed recently by Briault
(1995). This analysis provides a presump-
tion that inﬂation is a bad idea, but the
case is not decisive without supporting
empirical ﬁndings. Although some empiri-
cal results (also surveyed by Briault) sug-
gest that inﬂation is harmful, the evidence
is not overwhelming. It is therefore impor-
tant to carry out additional empirical re-
search on the relation between inﬂation
and economic performance. This article
explores this relation in a large sample of
countries over the last 30 years.
DATA
The data set covers over 100 countries
from 1960 to 1990. Table 1 provides infor-
mation about the behavior of inﬂation in
this sample. Annual inﬂation rates were
computed in most cases from consumer
price indexes. (The deﬂator for the gross
domestic product was used in a few in-
stances, when the data on consumer prices
were unavailable.) Table 1 shows the mean
and median across the countries of the in-
ﬂation rates in three decades: 1960–70,
1970–80, and 1980–90. The median inﬂa-
tion rate was 3.3 percent per year in the
1960s (117 countries), 10.1 percent in the
1970s (122 countries), and 8.9 percent in
the 1980s (119 countries). The upper
panel of Figure 1 provides a histogram for
the inﬂation rates observed over the three
decades. The bottom panel applies to the
44 observations for which the inﬂation
rate exceeded 20 percent per year.1
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The annual data were used for each
country over each decade to compute a
measure of inﬂation variability, the stan-
dard deviation of the inﬂation rate around
its decadal mean. Table 1 shows the mean
and median of these standard deviations
for the three decades. The median was 2.4
percent per year in the 1960s, 5.4 percent
in the 1970s, and 4.9 percent in the 1980s.
Thus, a rise in inﬂation variability accom-
panied the increase in the average inﬂation
rate since the 1960s.
Figure 2 conﬁrms the well-known view
that a higher variability of inﬂation tends to
accompany a higher average rate of inﬂa-
tion.2These charts provide scatter plots of
the standard deviation of inﬂation (mea-
sured for each country around its own dec-
adal mean) against the average inﬂation rate
(the mean of each country’s inﬂation rate
over the decade). The upper panel con-
siders only inﬂation rates below 15 percent
per year, the middle panel includes values
above 15 percent per year, and the lower
panel covers the entire range. The positive,
but imperfect, relation between variability
and mean is apparent throughout.
Table 1 also gives the means and me-
dians of the growth rate of real per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP) and the
ratio of investment to GDP for the three
decades. The median growth rate fell from
3.1 percent in the 1960s (118 countries)
to 2.5 percent in the 1970s (123 coun-
tries) and 0.4 percent in the 1980s (121
countries). The median investment ratio
went from 16 percent in the 1960s to 19
percent in the 1970s and 17 percent in the
1980s. In contrast to inﬂation rates, the
growth rates and investment ratios tend to
2
See, for example, Okun
(1971) and Logue and Willett
(1976).
Descriptive Statistics on Inﬂation, Growth, and Investment*
Variable Mean Median Number of Countries
1960–70
Inﬂation rate
Standard deviation of inﬂation rate
Growth rate of real per capita GDP
Ratio of investment to GDP
1970–80
Inﬂation rate
Standard deviation of inﬂation rate
Growth rate of real per capita GDP
Ratio of investment to GDP
1980–90
Inﬂation rate
Standard deviation of inﬂation rate
Growth rate of real per capita GDP
Ratio of investment to GDP
Table 1
* The inﬂation rate is computed on an annual basis for each country from data on consumer price indexes (from the World Bank; STARS databank; issues of World Tables;
International Monetary Fund; International Financial Statistics—yearbook issues; and individual country sources). In a few cases, ﬁgures on the GDP deﬂater were used. 
The average inﬂation rate for each country in each decade is the mean of the annual rates. The standard deviation for each country in each decade is the square root of the 
average squared difference of the annual inﬂation rate from the decadal mean. The values shown for inﬂation in this table are the mean or median across the countries of
the decade-average inﬂation rates. Similarly, the ﬁgures for standard deviations are the mean or median across the countries of the standard deviations for each decade. 
The growth rates of real per capita GDP are based on the purchasing power–adjusted GDP values compiled by Summers and Heston (1993). For the 1985–90 period, some
of the ﬁgures come from the World Bank (and are based on market exchange rates rather than purchasing-power comparisons). The ratios of real investment (private plus 
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To assess the effect of inﬂation on eco-
nomic growth, I use a system of regression
equations in which many other determi-
nants of growth are held constant. The
framework is based on an extended view
of the neoclassical growth model, as de-
scribed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995,
Chapters 1 and 2). My empirical imple-
mentations of this approach include Barro
(1991 and 1996).
A general notion in the framework is
that an array of government policies and
private-sector choices determine where an
economy will go in the long run. For exam-
ple, favorable public policies—including
better maintenance of the rule of law and
property rights, fewer distortions of private
markets, less nonproductive government
consumption, and greater public invest-
ment in high-return areas—lead in the long
run to higher levels of real per capita GDP .
(Henceforth, the termGDPwill be used as a
shorthand to denote real per capita GDP.)
Similarly, a greater willingness of the private
sector to save and a reduced tendency to ex-
pend resources on child rearing (lower fer-
tility and population growth) tend to raise
standards of living in the long run.
Given the determinants of the long-
run position, an economy tends currently 
to grow faster the lower its GDP. In other
words, an economy’s per capita growth rate
is increasing in the gap between its long-
term prospective GDP and its current GDP .
This force generates a convergence ten-
dency in which poor countries grow faster
than rich countries and tend thereby to
catch up in a proportional sense to the rich
places. However, poor countries grow fast
only if they have favorable settings for gov-
ernment policies and private-sector choices.
If a poor country selects unfavorable poli-
cies—a choice that likely explains why the
country is currently observed to be poor—
then its growth rate will not be high and it
will not tend to catch up to the richer places.
Figure 2a, b, c
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Versus Mean InﬂationAnother important element is a 
country’s human capital in the forms of
education and health. For given values 
of prospective and actual GDP , a country
grows faster—that is, approaches its long-
run position more rapidly—the greater its
current level of human capital. This effect
arises because, ﬁrst, physical capital tends
to expand rapidly to match a high en-
dowment of human capital, and, second,
a country with more human capital is
better equipped to acquire and adapt the
efﬁcient technologies that have been de-
veloped in the leading countries.
PANEL ESTIMATES OF
GROWTH EQUATIONS
Overview of the Results
Table 2 lists the explanatory variables
used as determinants of the growth rate of
real per capita GDP. The details for a simi-
lar setup are in Barro (1996). The results
apply to growth rates and the other vari-
ables observed for 78 countries from 1965
to 1975, 89 countries for 1975 to 1985,
and 84 countries from 1985 to 1990. This
sample reﬂects the availability of the nec-
essary data. The ﬁrst period starts in 1965,
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Regressions for Per Capita Growth Rate*







































































































* Standard errors of the coefﬁcient estimates are shown in parentheses. The R2 values and numbers of observations apply to each period individually.
The systems have three equations, where the dependent variables are the growth rate of real per capita GDP for 1965–75, 1975–85, and 1985–90. The variables GDP 
(real per capita GDP) and schooling (years of attainment at the secondary and higher levels) refer to 1965, 1975, and 1985. Life expectancy at birth is for 1960–64,
1970–74, and 1980–84. The rule-of-law index applies to the early 1980s (one observation for each country). The terms-of-trade variable is the growth rate over each pe-
riod of the ratio of export to import prices. The variable log(GDP)*human capital is the product of log(GDP) (expressed as a deviation from the sample mean) and the esti-
mated effect of the schooling and life-expectancy variables (also expressed as deviations from sample means). Variables measured as averages over each period are the log
of the total fertility rate, the ratio of government consumption (exclusive of defense and education) to GDP, the ratio of public educational spending to GDP, the black-market
premium on foreign exchange, the ratio of gross investment (public plus private) to GDP, the Gastil/Bollen indexes of political rights (where 0 indicates the fewest rights and 
1 the most), and the CPI inﬂation rate. The standard deviation of the inﬂation rate is measured from annual observations in relation to the mean inﬂation rate for each pe-
riod. The Latin American dummy equals 1 for countries in Latin America and 0 otherwise. Individual constants (not shown) are estimated for each period.
(continued on following page)rather than 1960, so that ﬁve-year lags of
the explanatory variables are available.
The estimation is by instrumental vari-
ables, where the instruments consist
mainly of prior values of the regressors.
For example, the 1965–75 equation in-
cludes the log of 1965 GDP on the right-
hand side and uses the log of 1960 GDP as
an instrument. This procedure should
lessen the estimation problems caused by
temporary measurement error in GDP. The
right-hand side also contains period aver-
ages of several variables—government
spending ratios, fertility rates, black-
market premia, and investment ratios—
and uses ﬁve-year earlier values of these
variables as instruments.
The use of lagged variables as instru-
ments is problematic, although better al-
ternatives are not obvious. One favorable
element here is that the residuals from the
growth equations turn out to be virtually
uncorrelated over the time periods. In
most respects, the instrumental results do
not differ greatly from OLS estimates. The
largest difference turns out to be for the
estimated effect of the investment ratio on
the growth rate.
Since the general pattern of results has
been considered elsewhere,3 I will provide
only a brief sketch here and will focus the
main discussion on the effects of inﬂation.
One familiar ﬁnding in Table 2 is that the
estimated coefﬁcient on initial log(GDP) is
3 See, for example, Barro
(1996).
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Regressions for Per Capita Growth Rate*
































































































Estimation is by instrumental variables. Columns 1 and 2 include actual inﬂation as an instrument. Column 2 also uses the standard deviation of inﬂation as an instrument.
Column 3 uses the ﬁve-year earlier values of inﬂation as instruments. Columns 4 and 5 use prior colonial status as instruments. Column 5 also uses the Latin America dummy 
as an instrument. The other instruments for all columns are the ﬁve-year earlier value of log(GDP) (for example, for 1960 in the 1965–75 equation); the schooling, life-
expectancy, rule-of-law, and terms-of-trade variables; and earlier values of the other variables. For example, the 1965–75 equation uses the averages of the black-market 
premium and the govenrment-spending and investment ratios for 1960–64. The estimation allows for different error variances in each period and for correlatiuon across these
errors. The estimated correlation of the errors for column 1 is  0.13 between the 1965–75 and 1975–85 equations, 0.10 between the 1965–75 and 1985–90 equations,
and 0.07 between the 1975–85 and 1985–90 equations. The pattern is similar for the other columns. The estimates are virtually the same if the errors are assumed to be
independent over the time periods.signiﬁcantly negative with a magnitude of
around 2.5 percent. Thus, conditional on
the other variables, convergence in real per
capita GDP occurs at roughly 2.5 percent
per year.4 Growth tends also to be increas-
ing in the initial levels of human capital in
the forms of education (average years of
school attainment at the secondary and
higher levels) and health (proxied by the
log of life expectancy at birth). The nega-
tive coefﬁcient on the interaction term be-
tween initial GDP and human capital5
means that the rate of convergence is
higher in a place that starts with more
human capital.
For given starting values of the state
variables (represented by initial human
capital and GDP), growth is estimated to
fall with higher fertility (the average wom-
an’s total fertility rate), higher government
consumption (the ratio to GDP of govern-
ment consumption, exclusive of spending
on education and defense), and a larger
black-market premium on foreign ex-
change (intended as a proxy for market
distortions more broadly).
Growth is enhanced by greater mainte-
nance of the rule of law, as measured by
Knack and Keefer’s (1995) subjective
index. One problem here is that this vari-
able is observed only in the early 1980s
(and is included among the instruments).
Growth also rises in response to a contem-
poraneous improvement in the terms of
trade, measured by the growth rate of the
ratio of export prices to import prices.
(The contemporaneous terms-of-trade
change is included with the instruments.)
The estimated coefﬁcients on the ratio
of public educational spending to GDP
and on the ratio of total real investment to
real GDP are positive, but insigniﬁcant.
The estimated coefﬁcient on investment
becomes higher and signiﬁcant if the con-
temporaneous investment ratio is included
with the instruments. (The timing in the
data indicates that much of the positive as-
sociation between investment and growth
represents the reverse response of invest-
ment to growth.) The estimate becomes
even larger and resembles that reported in
other studies, such as Mankiw, Romer, and
Weil (1992), if life expectancy is deleted as
a regressor.
Finally, an increase in democracy—
measured by indexes of political rights
from Gastil (1982–83) and Bollen
(1990)—have a nonlinear effect (which I
did not ﬁnd for log[GDP] or the human-
capital variables). At low levels of demo-
cracy, more freedom is estimated to raise
growth. But once a moderate level of
democracy is attained (corresponding
roughly to “half” the way toward full rep-
resentative democracy), further liberaliza-
tion is estimated to reduce growth. These
effects are discussed at length in Barro
(1996).
Preliminary Results on Inﬂation
To get a ﬁrst-pass estimate of the effect
of inﬂation on economic growth, I in-
cluded the inﬂation rate over each period
as an explanatory variable along with 
the other growth determinants listed in
Table 2. If contemporaneous inﬂation is
also included with the instruments, then
column 1 of Table 2 indicates that the esti-
mated coefﬁcient of inﬂation is 0.024
(s.e. 0.005). Thus, an increase by 10 per-
centage points in the annual inﬂation rate
is associated on impact with a decline by
0.24 percentage points in the annual
growth rate of GDP . Since the “t-statistic”
for the estimated coefﬁcient is 4.9, this re-
sult is statistically signiﬁcant.6
Figure 3 depicts graphically the rela-
tion between growth and inﬂation. The
horizontal axis plots the inﬂation rate;
each observation corresponds to the aver-
age rate for a particular country over one
of the time periods considered (1965–75,
1975–85, and 1985–90). The top panel in
the chart considers inﬂation rates below
15 percent per year, the middle panel in-
cludes values above 20 percent per year,
and the bottom panel covers the full range
of inﬂation. The vertical axis plots the
growth rate of GDP, net of the part of the
growth rate that is explained by all of the ex -
planatory variables aside from the inﬂation
rate.7 Thus, the panels illustrate the rela-
tion between growth and inﬂation after all
4 The actual rate is slightly higher
because the observed growth
rates are averages over periods
of 10 or 5 years. See Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 81).
5 Human capital is measured as
the overall estimated effect from
the levels of school attainment
and the log of life expectancy.
6 This estimate is similar to that
reported by Fischer (1993,
Table 9). For earlier estimates
of inﬂation variables in cross-
country regressions, see
Kormendi and Meguire (1985)
and Grier and Tullock (1989).
7 The residual is computed from
the regression system that
includes all of the variables,
including the inﬂation rate. But
the contribution from the inﬂa-
tion rate is left out to compute
the variable on the vertical axis
in the scatter diagram. The
residual has also been normal-
ized to have a zero mean.
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been held constant.
The panels of Figure 3 show downward-
sloping regression lines (least-squares lines)
through the scatter plots. The slope of the
line in the lower panel corresponds approxi-
mately to the signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁ-
cient shown in column 1 of Table 2. The
panels show, however, that the ﬁt is domi-
nated by the inverse relation between
growth and inﬂation at high rates of inﬂa-
tion. For inﬂation rates below 20 percent
per year, as shown in the upper panel, the
relation between growth and inﬂation is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
To put it another way, one can reesti-
mate the panel while restricting the obser-
vations to those for which the inﬂation
rate is less than some cutoff value, x. To
get a statistically signiﬁcant estimate for
the inﬂation coefﬁcient, x has to be raised
to roughly 50 percent per year. With an in-
ﬂation cutoff of 50 percent, the estimated
coefﬁcient is 0.029 (0.015). For lower
values of the cutoff, the estimated coefﬁ-
cient tends to be negative but insigniﬁ-
cant; some results are x 40 percent, 
coefﬁcient 0.023 (0.018); x 25 per-
cent, coefﬁcient 0.011 (0.027); x 15
percent, coefﬁcient 0.032 (0.042).
The results indicate that there is not
enough information in the low-inﬂation
experiences to isolate precisely the effect
of inﬂation on growth, but do not neces-
sarily mean that this effect is small at low
rates of inﬂation. To check for linearity of
the relation between growth and inﬂation,
I reestimated the system on the whole
sample with separate coefﬁcients for inﬂa-
tion in three ranges: up to 15 percent, be-
tween 15 percent and 40 percent, and over
40 percent. The estimated coefﬁcients on
inﬂation in this form are 0.016 (0.035)
in the low range, 0.037 (0.017) in the
middle range, and 0.023 (0.005) in the
upper range. Thus, the clear evidence for
the negative relation between growth and
inﬂation comes from the middle and upper
intervals. However, since the three esti-
mated coefﬁcients do not differ signiﬁ-
cantly from each other (p-value 0.65),
the data are consistent with a linear rela-
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Figure 3a, b, c
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Growth Rate Vs. Inﬂation Ratetionship. In particular, even at low rates of
inﬂation, the data would not reject the hy-
pothesis that growth is negatively related
to inﬂation.
Although statistically signiﬁcant effects
arise only when the high-inﬂation experi-
ences are included, the results are not sen-
sitive to a few outlier observations. Table 3
shows the 27 cases of inﬂation in excess of
40 percent per year for one of the time pe-
riods (1965–75, 1975–85, and 1985–90).
Note that Uruguay appears three times (al-
though it is by no means the overall cham-
pion for high inﬂation), and Argentina,
Brazil, Peru, Uganda, and Zaire show up
twice each. The other countries, with one
observation each, are Chile, Indonesia, Bo-
livia, Haiti, Israel, Guinea-Bissau, Mexico,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra
Leone, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
(Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Poland
are excluded from the regression sample
because of missing data on other vari-
ables.) The exclusion of any small number
of these high-inﬂation observations—
Nicaragua and Zaire had been suggested to
me—has a negligible effect on the results.
The estimates are also reasonably sta-
ble over time. If different coefﬁcients for
inﬂation are allowed for each period, 
but the system is otherwise the same as 
in column 1 of Table 2, then the resulting
estimates are 0.019 (0.015) for 1965–75,
0.029 (0.010) for 1975–85, and 0.023
(0.005) for 1985–90. These values do 
not differ signiﬁcantly from each other 
(p-value 0.20). (The higher signiﬁcance
of the estimated coefﬁcients in the two
later periods reﬂects the larger number of
high-inﬂation observations.)
The standard deviation of inﬂation can
be added to the system to see whether 
inﬂation variability has a relation with
growth when the average inﬂation rate 
is held constant. The strong positive corre-
lation between the mean and variability 
of inﬂation (Figure 2) suggests that it
would be difﬁcult to distinguish the in-
ﬂuences of these two aspects of inﬂation.
However, when the two variables are
entered jointly into the regression system
in column 2 of Table 2, the estimated 
coefﬁcient on inﬂation remains similar to
that found before ( 0.021 [0.008]), and
the estimated coefﬁcient on the standard
deviation of inﬂation is virtually zero
( 0.004 [0.009]).8 Thus, for a given 
average rate of inﬂation, the variability of
8 This system includes on the
right-hand side standard devia-
tions of inﬂation measured for
the periods 1965–75,
1975–85, and 1985–90.
These variables are also includ-
ed with the instruments.
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0.56inﬂation has no signiﬁcant relation with
growth. One possible interpretation of this
result is that the realized variability of in-
ﬂation over each period does not ade-
quately measure the uncertainty of inﬂa-
tion, the variable that one would have
expected to be negatively related to
growth. This issue is worth further in-
vestigation.
The Endogeneity of Inﬂation
A key problem in the interpretation of
the results is that they need not reﬂect
causation from inﬂation to growth. Inﬂa-
tion is an endogenous variable, which may
respond to growth or to other variables
that are related to growth. For example, an
inverse relation between growth and inﬂa-
tion would arise if an exogenous slowing
of the growth rate tended to generate
higher inﬂation. This increase in inﬂation
could result if monetary authorities re-
acted to economic slowdowns with expan-
sionary policies. Moreover, if the path of
monetary aggregates did not change, then
the equality between money supply and
demand at each point in time implies that
a reduction in the growth rate of output
would tend automatically to raise the in-
ﬂation rate.
Narayana Kocherlakota’s commentary
uses a sophisticated cash-in-advance the-
ory to focus on this last source of endo-
geneity bias. To ﬁx ideas, suppose as he
does that the money growth rate, µt, is de-
termined exogenously. The relation be-
tween the inﬂation rate, pt, and µt is given
from the money-supply-equals-money-
demand condition by
where gt is the growth rate of output and vt
is an independent shock to velocity (which
Kocherlakota takes to be nil). Suppose that
the effect of inﬂation on the growth rate is
described by
where et is an independent shock and a
is the coefﬁcient that we want to 
estimate.
In this framework, the OLS regression
coefﬁcient, 
^





will be close to a if the variances
of the shocks to money growth and veloc-
ity are much greater than those to output
growth.
Kocherlakota uses data from my
macroeconomics textbook, normally an
impeccable source, to estimate the vari-
ances. However, these ﬁgures are inappro-
priate for my panel estimation, which ap-
plies to different time periods. Using
averages over the three periods in the panel
and measuring money by either M1 or M2,
I ﬁnd that VAR(µ) .032, VAR(v) .004,
and VAR(e) .0002. Then a value a 0
corresponds to 
^
» -.006, and a value 
a = -.020 corresponds to 
^
» -.026. That
is, the bias would be small and could not
account for the empirical ﬁndings. More-
over, if inﬂation, rather than money
growth, were determined exogenously ,
then the bias would be nil.
The Kocherlakota argument also im-
plies that the results would be very differ-
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Inﬂation and Central Bank Independenceent if one included money growth, rather
than inﬂation, in the growth regressions. 
If the panel estimation from column 1 of
Table 2 is redone with M1 growth replacing
the inﬂation rate, then the estimated coefﬁ-
cient is 0.0225 (0.0057). If M2 growth is
used instead, the result is 0.0191
(0.0054). Thus, the estimated coefﬁcient is
about the same with money growth as with
inﬂation. Basically, the results reveal an in-
verse relation between the growth rate of
GDP and the growth rate of prices or
money. The distinction between inﬂation
and money growth has nothing to do with
the ﬁndings.
It is also possible that the endogeneity
of inﬂation would produce a positive rela-
tion between inﬂation and growth. This
pattern tends to emerge if output ﬂuctua-
tions are driven primarily by shocks to
money or to the aggregate demand for
goods.
Another possibility is that some omit-
ted third variable is correlated with growth
and inﬂation. For example, better enforce-
ment of property rights is likely to spur in-
vestment and growth and is also likely to
accompany a rules-based setup in which
the monetary authority generates a lower
average rate of inﬂation. The idea is that a
committed monetary policy represents the
application of the rule of law to the behav-
ior of the monetary authority. Some of the
explanatory variables in the system attempt
to capture the degree of maintenance of the
rule of law. However, to the extent that
these measures are imperfect, the inﬂation
rate may proxy inversely for the rule of law
and thereby show up as a negative inﬂu-
ence on growth. The estimated coefﬁcient
on the inﬂation rate could therefore reﬂect
an effect on growth that has nothing to do
with inﬂation per se.
Some researchers like to handle this
type of problem by using some variant of
ﬁxed-effects estimation; that is, by allow-
ing for an individual constant for each
country. This procedure basically elimi-
nates cross-sectional information from the
sample and therefore relies on effects
within countries from changes over time
in inﬂation and other variables. It is not
apparent that problems of correlation of
inﬂation with omitted variables would be
less serious in this time-series context
than in cross-sections. (If a country is un-
dergoing an inﬂation crisis or implement-
ing a monetary reform, then it is likely to
be experiencing other crises or reforms at
the same time.) Moreover, the problems
with measurement error and timing of re-
lationships would be more substantial in
the time series. The one thing that is clear
is that ﬁxed-effects procedures eliminate a
lot of information.
Another way to proceed is to ﬁnd 
satisfactory instrumental variables—
reasonably exogenous variables that are
themselves signiﬁcantly related to inﬂa-
tion. My search along these lines pro-
ceeded along the sequence now described.
Central bank independence. One promising
source of instruments for inﬂation in-
volves legal provisions that more or less
guarantee central bank independence. Re-
cent literature argues that a greater degree
of independence leads to lower average
rates of money growth and inﬂation and to
greater monetary stability.9 The idea is that
independence enhances the ability of the
central bank to commit to price stability
and, hence, to deliver low and stable inﬂa-
tion. Alesina and Summers (1993, Figures
1a and b) ﬁnd striking negative relation-
ships among 16 developed countries from
1955 to 1988 between an index of the de-
gree of central bank independence and the
mean and variance of inﬂation. Thus, in
their context, the measure of central bank
independence satisﬁes one condition
needed for a good inﬂation instrument; 
it has substantial explanatory power for
inﬂation.
Because of the difﬁculty of enacting
changes in laws, it is plausible that a good
deal of the cross-country differences in legal
provisions that inﬂuence central bank inde-
pendence can be treated as exogenous.
Problems arise, however, if the legal frame-
work changes in response to inﬂation (al-
though the sign of this interaction is un-
clear). In addition, exogeneity would be
violated if alterations in a country’s legal en-
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9 Bade and Parkin (1982); Grilli,
Masciandaro, and Tabellini
(1991); Cukierman (1992);
and Alesina and Summers
(1993).vironment for monetary policy are corre-
lated with changes in unmeasured institu-
tional features—such as structures that
maintain property rights—that inﬂuence
growth rates. This problem is, however, mit-
igated by the inclusion of other explanatory
variables, notably the index of the rule of
law, in the regression framework.
Cukierman (1992, chapter 19) argues
that the legal provisions that govern cen-
tral bank action differ substantially from
the way that the banks actually operate. In
particular, he distinguishes the legal term
of ofﬁce of the central bank governor from
the observed turnover. The latter variable
would be more closely related to bank per-
formance (and, hence, to inﬂation), but
cannot be treated as exogenous to growth
or omitted third variables. Thus, for the
purpose of constructing instruments for
inﬂation, the preferred strategy is to focus
on the extent to which inﬂation can be ex-
plained by differences in legal provisions
for the central bank.
Table 4 shows an index of central bank
independence for 67 countries, based on 
the information compiled by Cukierman
(1992, chapter 19, Appendix A) over time
periods that correspond roughly to the four
decades from the 1950s to the 1980s. The
index is an average over the time periods
and for numerous categories of legal provi-
sions contained in the charters of the central
banks. (See the notes to Table 4.) The details
of construction differ somewhat from those
used by Cukierman, but the values shown
in Table 4 are similar to those reported in his
Table 19.3 for the 1980s.
Table 4 also contains the average inﬂa-
tion rate from 1960 to 1990 for the 67
countries in my sample that have data on
the index of central bank independence. A
comparison between the index and the in-
ﬂation rate reveals a crucial problem; the
correlation between the two variables is
essentially zero, as in clear from Figure 4.
This verdict is also maintained if one looks
separately over the three decades from the
1960s to the 1980s and if one holds con-
stant other possible determinants of inﬂa-
tion. In this broad sample of countries,
differences in legal provisions that ought
to affect central bank independence have
no explanatory power for inﬂation.10 This
negative ﬁnding is of considerable interest,
because it suggests that low inﬂation can-
not be attained merely by instituting legal
changes that appear to promote a more in-
dependent central bank. However, the re-
sult also means that we have to search fur-
ther for instruments to clarify the relation
between growth and inﬂation.11
Lagged inﬂation. Earlier values of a coun-
try’s inﬂation rate have substantial ex-
planatory power for inﬂation.12 Lagged 
inﬂation would also be exogenous with re-
spect to innovations in subsequent growth
rates. Hence, if lagged inﬂation is used as
an instrument, then the estimated relation
between growth and inﬂation would not
tend to reﬂect the short-run reverse effect
of growth on inﬂation.
One problem, however, is that lagged
inﬂation would reﬂect persistent charac-
teristics of a country’s monetary institu-
tions (such as the extent to which policy-
makers have credibility), and these
characteristics could be correlated with
omitted variables that are relevant to
growth (such as the extent to which politi-
cal institutions support the maintenance of
property rights). The use of lagged inﬂa-
tion as an instrument would therefore not
rule out the problems of interpretation
that derive from omitted third variables.
However, the inclusion of the other ex-
planatory variables in the regression
framework lessens this problem. Another
favorable element is that the residuals
from the growth equations are not signiﬁ-
cantly correlated over the time periods.
Column 3 of Table 2 shows the esti-
mated effect of inﬂation on the growth rate
when lagged inﬂation (over the ﬁve years
prior to each sample period) is used as an
instrument. The estimated coefﬁcient
is 0.020 (0.007), similar to that found in
column 1 when contemporaneous inﬂa-
tion is included as an instrument. Thus, it
seems that most of the estimated negative
relation between growth and inﬂation does
not represent reverse short-term (negative)
effects of growth on inﬂation.
10Cukierman’s (1992, chapter
20) results concur with this
ﬁnding, especially for samples
that go beyond a small number
of developed countries, the
kind of sample used in most of
the literature on central bank
independence.
11Cukierman et al. (1993) use
as instruments the turnover
rate of bank governors and the
average number of changes in
bank leadership that occur with-
in six months of a change in
government. These measures
of actual bank independence
have substantial explanatory
power for inﬂation but would
not tend to be exogenous with
respect to growth.
12I have carried out SUR estima-
tion of a panel system with the
inﬂation rate as the dependent
variable (for 1965–75,
1975–85, and 1985–90),
where the independent vari-
ables are lagged inﬂation and
the other instrumental variables
used in Table 2. The estimated
coefﬁcient of lagged inﬂation is
0.74 (0.06). The only other
coefﬁcients that reach marginal
signiﬁcance are for log(GDP),
0.037 (0.019); the black-
market premium, 0.059
(0.033); the change in the
terms of trade, 0.40
(0.22); and the rule-of-law
index, 0.009 (0.005). The
R
2values for the three periods
are 0.55, 0.24, and 0.37.
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of inﬂation on growth still shows up 
only when the high-inﬂation observations
are included. The results are, however,
again consistent with a linear relation 
and with stability over the time periods.
The standard deviation of inﬂation also
remains insigniﬁcant if it is added to 
the regressions (with lagged values of 
this standard deviation included as in-
struments).
Prior colonial status. Another possible in-
strument for inﬂation comes from the ob-
servation that prior colonial status has
substantial explanatory power for inﬂa-
tion. Table 5 breaks down averages of in-
ﬂation rates from 1960 to 1990 by groups
of countries classiﬁed as non-colonies (de-
ﬁned as those that were independent prior
to U.S. independence in 1776) and former
colonies of Britain, France, Spain or Portu-
gal, and other countries (in this sample,
Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, and the United States).
Table 5 indicates that the average 
inﬂation rate for all 117 countries from
1960 to 1990 is 12.6 percent per year.
The average for the 30 non-colonies of
8.9 percent is similar to that of 10.4 per-
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* The index of central bank independence is computed from data in Cukierman (1992, chapter 19, Appendix A). The index is a weighted average of the available data from
1950 to 1989 of legal provisions regarding (1) appointment and dismissal of the governor (weight 1/6), (2) procedures for the formulation of monetary policy (weight
1/6), (3) objectives of central bank policy (weight 1/6), and (4) limitations on lending by the central bank (weight 1/2). The ﬁrst category is an unweighted average of  
(continued on following page)cent for the 42 British colonies and 6.6
percent for the 20 French colonies. How-
ever, the rates are strikingly higher for 
the 18 Spanish or Portuguese colonies—
29.4 percent—and somewhat higher for
the 7 other colonies—16.1 percent.
A key reason for the low average inﬂa-
tion rate for the former French colonies is
the participation of most of the sub-Saha-
ran African states in the ﬁxed–exchange
rate regime of the CFA Franc.13 This type
of reasonably exogenous commitment to
relatively low inﬂation is exactly the kind
of experiment that provides for a good in-
strument for inﬂation.
For many of the former British col-
onies, a signiﬁcant element may be their
prior experience with British organized
currency boards, another system that tends
to generate low inﬂation.14 These boards
involved, at one time or another before in-
dependence, most of the British colonies
in Africa, the Caribbean, southeast Asia,
and the Middle East.
The high average inﬂation rate for the
16 former Spanish colonies in the sample
does not reﬂect, per se, their presence in
Latin America. For seven Latin American
countries that are not former Spanish or
Portuguese colonies,15 the average inﬂation
rate for 1960–90 is only 9.0 percent, virtu-
ally the same as that for the non-colonies
(see Table 5). Also, four former Portu-
guese colonies in Africa experienced the
13For discussions of the CFA Franc
zone, see Boughton (forthcom-
ing) and Clement (1994). The
zone maintained a ﬁxed ex-
change rate with the French
Franc for 45 years until the de-
valuation from 50 to 100 CFA
Francs per French Franc in Janu-
ary 1994. At the time of the
devaluation, the zone covered
14 African countries grouped
around three central banks: the
West African Monetary Union of
Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory
Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal,
and Togo; a group of central
African countries consisting of
Cameroon, Central African Re-
public, Chad, Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, and Gabon; and the Co-
moros. Some original members
of the zone left to establish in-
dependent currencies—Dji-
bouti in 1949, Guinea in
1958, Mali in 1962 (until it re-
joined in 1984), Madagascar
in 1963, Mauritania in 1973,
and the Comoros in 1981 (to
set up its own form of CFA
franc). Equatorial Guinea,
which joined in 1985, is the
only member that is not a for-
mer colony of France (and not
French speaking).
14See Schwartz (1993).
15The seven in the sample are
Barbados, Dominican Republic
(attributed to France rather
than to Spain; see the notes to
Table 5), Guyana, Haiti,
Jamaica, Suriname, and
Trinidad and Tobago. Five other
former British colonies in Latin
America that are not in this
sample—Bahamas, Belize,
Grenada, St. Lucia, and St.
Vincent—experienced the rela-
tively low average inﬂation rate
of 6.9 percent from 1970 to
1990.
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three underlying variables that involve the governor’s term of ofﬁce and the procedures for appointment and dismissal. The second category is an unweighted average of
two variables, one indicating the location of the authority for setting monetary policy and the other specifying methods for resolving conﬂicts about policy. The third cate-
gory relates to the prominence attached to price stability in the bank’s charter. The fourth category is an unweighted average of four variables: limitations on advances,
limitations on securitized lending, an indicator for the location of the authority that prescribes lending terms, and the circle of potential borrowers from the central bank.
For each underlying variable, Cukierman deﬁnes a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates least favorable to central bank independence and 1 indicates most favorable. The
overall index shown in Table 4 runs correspondingly from 0 to 1. See Table 1 for a discussion of the inﬂation data.
‡1975–90
†1970–90
(continued from page 164)relatively high average inﬂation rate of
around 20 percent.16 For Portugal and
Spain themselves, the average inﬂation
rate of 10.9 percent for 1960–90 is well
below the rate of 29.4 percent experienced
by their former colonies. However,
10.9 percent inﬂation is substantially
higher than that experienced by France
(6.4 percent) and the United Kingdom
(7.7 percent).
Column 4 of Table 2 shows the esti-
mated effect of inﬂation on the growth
rate of GDP when the instruments ex-
clude contemporaneous or lagged inﬂa-
tion but include indicators of prior colo-
nial status. The two variables used are a
dummy for whether the country is a for-
mer Spanish or Portuguese colony and a
dummy for whether the country is a for-
mer colony of a country other than
Britain, France, Spain, or Portugal.17 The
estimated coefﬁcient on the inﬂation rate
is now 0.031 (0.008), somewhat higher
in magnitude than that found when 
contemporaneous or lagged inﬂation is
used as an instrument. The signiﬁcantly
negative relation between growth and 
inﬂation again arises only when the 
high-inﬂation experiences are included 
in the sample. The results also continue
to be stable over the time periods.
One question about the procedure is
whether prior colonial status works in
the growth regressions only because it
serves as an imperfect proxy for Latin
America, a region that is known to have
experienced surprisingly weak economic
growth.18 However, column 5 of Table 2
shows that if a dummy variable for Latin
America is included in the system (and
the indicators of prior colonial status and
the Latin America dummy are used as in-
struments), then the estimated coefﬁcient
of inﬂation remains negative and signiﬁ-
cant, 0.025 (0.009). Moreover, the esti-
mated coefﬁcient on the Latin America
dummy is only marginally signiﬁ-
cant, 0.0060 (0.0034). The results are
basically the same if the Latin America
dummy is added to the system from 
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16These four are Angola, Cape
Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and
Mozambique. Data are unavail-
able for Cape Verde and
Guinea-Bissau in the 1960s
(prior to independence). The
ﬁgures for Angola in the 1980s
are rough estimates.
17I have carried out SUR estima-
tion of a panel system with the
inﬂation rate as the dependent
variable (for 1965–75,
1975–85, and 1985–90),
where the independent vari-
ables are the two colony dum-
mies and the other instrumental
variables—mainly lagged vari-
ables—used in Table 2. This
system excludes lagged inﬂa-
tion (see footnote 12). The es-
timated coefﬁcient on the
Spain-Portugal colonial dummy
is 0.14 (0.03) and that on the
dummy for other colonies is
0.11 (0.05). The R
2values are
0.38 for 1965–75, 0.14 for
1975–85, and 0.10 for
1985–90. Thus, inﬂation is dif-
ﬁcult to explain, especially if
most contemporaneous vari-
ables and lagged inﬂation are
excluded as regressors. Two 
variables that are sometimes
suggested as determinants of
inﬂation—trade openness
(measured by lagged ratios of
exports and imports to GDP)
and country size (measured by
log of population)—are in-
signiﬁcant if added to the sys-
tem. Years since independence
also has no explanatory power
for inﬂation. This result may
arise because the former
colonies of Spain and Portugal
in Latin America became inde-
pendent at roughly the same
time.
18See, for example, the results in
Barro 1991.
I n ﬂation Rates and Prior Colonial Status*
Latin America
Spanish or not Spanish
All Non- British French Portugese Other or Portugese
Period Countries Colony Colony Colony Colony Colony Colony
1960–70 .054 .045 .033 .030 .089 .194 .031
(121) (31) (43) (21) (19) (7) (7)
1970–80 .131 .110 .120 .093 .218 .147 .109
(131) (32) (50) (20) (21) (8) (11)
1980–90 .182 .124 .139 .074 .523 .136 .097
(132) (31) (51) (22) (20) (8) (11)
1960–90 .126 .089 .104 .066 .294 .161 .090
(117) (30) (42) (20) (18) (7) (7)
Table 5
* The numbers shown in parentheses are the numbers of countries with available data that fall into each category. See Table 1 for a discussion of the inﬂation data.
Countries that were independent before 1776 are treated as non-colonies. Otherwise, the colonial status refers to the most recent outside power; for example, the
Philippines is attributed to the United States rather than to Spain; Rwanda and Burundi are attributed to Belgium rather than to Germany; and the Dominican Republic is
attributed to France rather than to Spain. Some countries that were dominated by other countires for some periods are treated as non-colonies. Examples are Hungary,
Poland, South Korea, and Taiwan. The only present-day colony in the sample is Hong Kong. The last column refers to countries that are located in Latin America but are
not former Spanish or Portugese colonies.column 1 of Table 2, in which contempo-
raneous inﬂation is used as an instru-
ment. It therefore appears that much of
the estimated effect of a Latin America
dummy on growth rates in previous re-
search reﬂected a proxying of this
dummy for high inﬂation. In particular,
the negative effect of inﬂation on growth
does not just reﬂect the tendency for
many high-inﬂation countries to be in
Latin America.
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF 
INFLATION ON INVESTMENT
A likely channel by which inﬂation
decreases growth is through a reduction
in the propensity to invest. (This effect is
already held constant by the presence of
the investment ratio in the growth regres-
sions.) I have investigated the determina-
tion of the ratio of investment to GDP
within a framework that parallels the one
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Regressions for Investment Ratio*








































































































* The systems have three equations, where the dependent variables are the ratios of real gross investment to real GDP for 1965–75, 1975–85, and 1985–90. See the
notes to Table 2 for deﬁnitions of the variables. Estimation is by instrumental variables. Column 1 includes inﬂation as an instrument. Column 2 uses inﬂation over the
previous ﬁve years as an instrument. Column 3 uses prior colonial status as instruments. See the notes to Table 2 for descriptions of the other instruments.set out in Table 2. The results are in
Table 6.
In the case of the investment ratio, the
use of instruments turns out to be crucial
for isolating a negative effect of inﬂation.
In column 1 of Table 6, which uses con-
temporaneous inﬂation as an instrument,
the estimated coefﬁcient on the inﬂation
rate is virtually zero, 0.001 (0.011). In
contrast, the result in column 2 with
lagged inﬂation used as an instrument
is 0.059 (0.017). Similarly, the result in
column 3 with the indicators of prior colo-
nial status used as instruments is 0.044
(0.022). The last two estimates imply that
an increase in average inﬂation by 10 per-
centage points per year would lower the
investment ratio on impact by 0.4 percent-
age point to 0.6 percentage point.
Even when the instruments are used,
the adverse effect of inﬂation on invest-
ment shows up clearly only when the
high-inﬂation observations are included in
the sample. This ﬁnding accords with the
results for growth rates.
CONCLUDING 
OBSERVATIONS
A major ﬁnding from the empirical
analysis is that the estimated effects of in-
ﬂation on growth and investment are sig-
niﬁcantly negative when some plausible
instruments are used in the statistical pro-
cedures. Thus, there is some reason to be-
lieve that the relations reﬂect causation
from higher long-term inﬂation to reduced
growth and investment.
It should be stressed that the clear 
evidence for adverse effects of inﬂation
comes from the experiences of high in-
ﬂation. The magnitudes of effects are
also not that large. For example, an in-
crease in the average inﬂation rate by 10
percentage points per year is estimated 
to lower the growth rate of real per capita
GDP (on impact) by 0.2 percentage point
to 0.3 percentage point per year.
Some people have reacted to these
kinds of ﬁndings by expressing skepticism
about the value of cross-country empirical
work. In fact, the wide differences in in-
ﬂation experiences offered by the cross-
section provide the best opportunity for
ascertaining the long-term effects of inﬂa-
tion and other variables on economic per-
formance. If the effects cannot be detected
accurately in this kind of sample, then
they probably cannot be pinpointed any-
where else. In particular, the usual focus
on annual or quarterly time series of 30 to
40 years for one or a few countries is
much less promising.
In any event, the apparently small esti-
mated effects of inﬂation on growth are
misleading. Over long periods, these
changes in growth rates have dramatic ef-
fects on standards of living. For example, a
reduction in the growth rate by 0.2 per-
centage point to 0.3 percentage point per
year (produced on impact by 10 percent-
age points more of average inﬂation)
means that the level of real GDP would be
lowered after 30 years by 4 percent to 7
percent.19 In mid-1995, the U.S. GDP was
over $7 trillion; 4 percent to 7 percent of
this amount is $300 billion to $500 bil-
lion, more than enough to justify a keen
interest in price stability.
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